2023-11-13
Limited nuclear war is a strategic concept in which a nation uses its low-yield nuclear weapons against a advisories conventional force to deter them from further aggression and demonstrated that you mean serious business and go crazy to launch all your nuclear weapons if necessary.
The idea of limited nuclear war first come into the picture during the Cold War in 1950s and 1960s in US strategy doctrine; after World War 2 European power become too weak and Soviets overwhelming conventional capability poised a serious threat to NATO and west Europe. The fear of a Soviet advance and potentially capturing territories from west Germany to the English Channel, left Americans with limited sets of options for deterrence. And then the idea of limited nuclear war was coming into picture. In this strategy if soviets or Warsaw invaded west Europe then American’s will used some of its nuclear weapons in the Bettel field against the soviets and single the soviets that we have serious business in there and we could go anywhere for this.
With the advance in military technology and destructive power of nuclear weapons grew, the notion of limited or full-scale nuclear war unwinnable and unsustainable. This led to the abandonment of the idea of limited nuclear war in the late 1980s.
However, by 2014, with the new emerging threats, growing modern Authoritarians regimes with nuclear weapons and increasing tensions and competition with China/Russia bring back the concept of limited nuclear war in the USA policy doctrine.
In this article I will go through the debates around the limited nuclear war and try to give a conclusion, is limited nuclear war still a viable option for achieving strategic objectives.
The Objective of this article is to go through the debates surrounding the limited nuclear war, there arguments, perspectives in the context of the current world. Are these debates being still relevant in the contemporary world? what are the possible drawback of the arguments of these debates? Are these arguments able to tackle the challenges of modern authoritarian regime like North Korea and Iran? And in the end try to provide a solution for securing national interests in the contemporary world.
After the World War II, USA and USSR both steadily growing their nuclear arsenal throughout 1950s. The underling idea of that time was to deter an advisory by threating overwhelming destruction if certain limits were crossed. And both states have enough warheads to ensure that a nuclear attack on one would result in the assured mutual destruction of both parties. Which is known as a Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD.
However, MAD face significant challenges. One of the key challenges was that it is not realistic to employ a large-scale nuclear weapons response to conventional provocation. And chances are that an advisory might not take this kind of response seriously given the catastrophic consequences involved.
For those challenges, in 1960s American policy makers began search of new strategy that don't rely on massive retaliation. To re-established nuclear deterrence a flexible nuclear used was recommended. The concept of limited nuclear war then came into vogue. While there is no definition of limited nuclear war, it may take as a used a limited number of low yield nuclear warheads on limited set of military targets to deter advisory from further hostilities and achieve national interest. Such kind an attack enabled by the advances in technology, advances in precision delivery system and high level of situational awareness about situation and enemy nuclear storage sites; which allows to attack advisory without escalating the conflict.
Before starting the discussion on debates, it is important the identify what are the possible challenges for conduction a limited nuclear war. By definition limited nuclear war is use a limited number of low yield nukes in a limited set of targets in a limited geographical area with logical and control manner. But there are some key problems. First is, how to decide what is limited nuclear war? There is no definition that certain number of nukes used would consider as a limited; It depends on the opponent perception to decide what is limited or not. There is no guaranty that opponent get the signal right and response in same manner.
Second problem is it every be possible to direct a nuclear force to conduction a limited nuclear war. It is hard to train and organized a force that understand the ground battle situation, possible response from the opponent and impact on their nation of the attack. A force that can select the targets in very changing battle ground without causing a full-scale nuclear exchange.
Third problem is limited nuclear war increases the chances of full-scale nuclear exchange and promotes use of small nuclear warheads. It increases the temptation of use of nuclear warhead. Limited nuclear war creates a sense of vulnerability in country, which increases the likelihood of getting a pre-emptive nuclear strike, which makes it more likely a nuclear exchange.
Last issue is to conduction a limited war, a state needs to assume that the opponent will response in same logical and rational manner, which can be not true in some cases. Which can lead to escalation.
In sum, the challenges of conducting a limited nuclear war are deeply rooted in the complexities of perception, organization, and the inherent risks of escalation.
Debating the Viability of Limited Nuclear War has been a topic of intense scrutiny and contention since its inception during the early years of the Cold War. Advocates argue that it provides a nuanced approach to security challenges, enabling the possibility of confronting adversaries without unleashing catastrophic destruction. However, detractors contend that the risks and potential consequences of limited nuclear war far outweigh any perceived benefits, often questioning whether such a strategy can truly be controlled and contained. In this debate, go thorough exploration of the viability of this controversial strategy in the contemporary world.
First criticism of limited nuclear war is that it is not a credible and feasible military strategy. Limited nuclear war is often considered as a credible and feasible strategy to achieve national interest. But critics pointed it is not. Using nuclear warheads for counter force capability and building precision strike platform; can lead to more focus on use of nuclear weapons for fighting wars. It can create a spiral effect where many states will try to build a low yield nuclear arsenal and building precision strike delivery system. And number of states with nuclear weapons may will increases. The availability of nuclear weapons facility, raw martials and infrastructure not only increase the likelihood of nuclear war, but it also increases chances of a non-state actor to getting a nuke.
Critics, therefore, provide some of the major challenge of limited nuclear war, like a non-state actor somehow getting nuke and it could lead to an arms race among countries. But it doesn’t consider involvement of the modern authoritarian regimes who are willing to use nukes to get their objectives. Although critics able to identify the potential challenge of a non-state actor get the nukes; but they miss the point that modern authoritarian regimes who are willing to give nukes to non-state actor to achieve their personal interest. If we see the contemporary world, then we see many examples where state supporting the non-state actors, providing funding and provide weapons to advance their interests through proxy warfare. For instance; Iran backed Hezbollah or many non-state terror organisations backed by Pakistan. Furthermore, in East Asia where North Korea use it nuclear arsenal to bulling South Korea and Japan.
Critics pointed that a limited nuclear war strategy could create an arms race between states. Nevertheless, there is already an ongoing arms race in the Pacific, particularly between China and the United States.
Second criticism of limited nuclear war as Impractical and Dangerous, support no-first use policy like India, based on deterrence by punishment. No-first strike policy is extremely useful in the Indian sub-continent, where India and Pakistan, both of are nuclear power. In the Indian sub-continent limited nuclear war strategy will not work because lack trust between two states, if one launches a limited strike then opposite site might considered it as full-scale war.
Although, No-first strike policy is extremely useful in Indian sub-continent but considering the current complex world its usefulness diminishes outside the South Asia. For instance, in West Asia, South Korea and Japan both of are comes under the US nuclear umbrella. Because of the US nuclear umbrella South Korea and Japan did not yet build any nuclear weapons event after constant threat from North Korea, both of are advance economy and have all of resources to build nuclear weapons. Let assumed for a movement that the US adopted a no-first strike policy which mean US will strike with nukes only if some state first strike US homeland with nukes. In this scenario Japan and South Korea will directly come under threat of North Korea, which will eventually lead to a nuclear power Japan and South Korea in the East Asia. This scenario further complicates the geopolitical landscape of East Asia and increases the probability of nuclear conflict in Asia.
A storage advocacy for limited nuclear war is coming from its utility to deal with the modern authoritarian regimes. Major Shane “Axl” Praiswater in his article “Strategies of Limited Nuclear War with Modern Authoritarians” argued that a limited nuclear war is not a desired situation, but it is the most likely scenario if any party finds it necessary to employ a nuclear device. Modern regimes are primarily motivated not by state goals, but by the desire to remain securely in power. He pointed, if US did not try to remove them from the power, then chances are that they will not use their nuclear weapons, even after a taking a limited strike which will not threat to their power or help to increase their grip on power. He argued that to win limited nuclear war US policy makers first need to understand the opposite regime concerns and the possible impact of US action on them. If the US action will threaten their grip on power, then action should not be taken or in other case if US action does not threat them then action can be taken against the advisory.
Above argument provides how to deal with modern regimes, modern regimes primary motivation and importance of understanding the modern regimes concern by the policy makes. Still, it has some key problem, first it considers states as a rational actor which not in the most cases while it comes to authoritarian regimes. Second problem is that how will decide an action is threating or not to an authoritarian regime, miscalculation can lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange. For instance, Let's assume around 2027 or 2028 China launce an invasion of Taiwan and in the response of the invasion US launce a limited strike on China with an assumption that strike is only to deter China from capturing Taiwan, But Chines take it differently, they think that if they stop the invasion then it cloud single a weakness of CCP to the Chines people and potentially lose their grip on power. Which can motivate Chines to retaliated with a nuclear strike to US, potentially lead to the full-scale nuclear exchange.
One other approach for dealing with current world challenges is to use conventional forces and not relay on nuclear forces. To deal with the challenge of tactical nuclear weapons is developing a strategy obviating their need altogether. Robert Haffa explores this option in his article “The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition.” He indicated that to avoid a great power conflict is to develop a strategy that employ large and formidable conventional force to deter an aggression by potential adversaries. Haffa points that a conventional deterrent is more credible than a nuclear deterrent because it removes the possibility that the State might be self-deterred by the gravity of a decision to employ nuclear weapons.
Haffa’s approach will be great fit for dealing with the challenges in many arenas in the world. For instance, In Taiwan China conflict, US by using a large, robust and formidable naval and air force with network of military bases in Philippine, Japan and US territories in Pacific, US and Its pacific allies can deter China from possible invasion of Taiwan. If China did not deter and launce an invasion, then Americans can utilize their network of bases and their naval assets to support Taiwan, providing weapons, food, energy and medical equipment's etc; Launce a counter conventional strike on Chines navy to destroy Chines navy ships and Chine's costal ports from where Chine will possibly be going to mobilized their troops; without sparking a nuclear war.
Haffa’s approach will also great fit for the European theatre to deal with the Russians. By building and maintaining a large ground force in Poland and Baltic states with heavy Air support, US and NATO can deter Russians from launching a campaign to take over old Soviet republics. Ground forces should include heavily armoured and mechanized units, mobile units, mobile and conventional artillery units, and a robust logistical system to resupply them, and a strong industrial base for producing weapons in mass quantity in case of a war. In case of Russian plan for an attack on Baltic state, NATO can use its East European forces to show Russian what are the possible consequence of an attack. If NATO military in East Europe is large enough more then 250,000 NATO active soldiers with host nations soldiers and a robust number of MBT, mobile rocket artillery, air defence, and 1000s of armoured vehicle, and support of American air power from land and Baltic Sea. NATO can deter Russian from launching a campaign against NATO’s Eastern members.
Event to Conventional approach has number of advantages, still it faces some key challenges. First, there is no guaranty that opposite side will not going to use its nuclear arsenal, if opposite side think that they will lose a conventional war then there is a high probability that they will think about go nuclear. For instance, In East Europe if Americans have far superior forces, then in case of a war in East Europe Russian might think to go nuclear because there is no chance that Russian can win a conventional war with NATO. Second, maintaining formidable conventional forces in all fronts are very expensive and consume lot of Matale and Soldiers, no great power had every able to maintain large number of forces in all fronts.
Integration of nuclear weapons with conventional forces is another approach in limited nuclear war, idea is that instead of maintaining a large conventional force, a state could maintain a small force with Tactical nuclear weapons. Advance of technology, delivery system, precision strike platform and small, low-yield tactical nuclear warheads enable states to integrate nukes in the conventional forces. There are number of benefits of integrating nukes with conventional forces; firstly, it reduces cost of maintain a large military. In first sight cost might not seem like a significant factor but it is, conventional forces are more expensive compared to maintain couple of 100 nukes with a small missile and rocket force. For example, 2022/23 British military expenditures around 55.5 billion British pounds6, while their expenditure on nuclear arsenal was around 6.8 billion British pounds7. Secondly, building and training a force that can understand battle situation and geopolitical impact of their action is very challenging. Thirdly, chances of escalation become higher because opponent may use their nuclear weapons pre-emptively in the fear of getting some nukes shots or losing it nuclear strike capability by an attack on its nuclear arsenal.
In conclusion, the debate over the viability of limited nuclear war remains a contentious and complex issue. Advocates argue that it offers a nuanced approach to security challenges, while detractors highlight the potential risks and unintended consequences. The dynamic nature of global politics, the involvement of modern authoritarian regimes, and the constant evolution of technology continue to shape this debate. As we navigate the contemporary world, it is crucial to carefully consider the potential benefits and drawbacks of such strategies, recognizing that the path to a more secure future lies in thoughtful analysis and international cooperation. The quest for a safer world requires a balanced approach that incorporates diplomatic, conventional, and nuclear strategies, each playing a unique role in maintaining global stability.
To deal with challenges of contemporary world a state will need a “flexible strategy”. A state needs to select a strategy based on the resources, capability and position in the world. The strategy should simply not relay on a certain hard coded rule like not-using nukes, no-first strike, limited first strike or conventional response. Instead, strategy should be flexible, combine conventional, nuclear triad option, economic, technological and soft power backed by a strong industrial capability, Policy should adaptive according to the region and opponent. For instance, In the case of US, Americans should adopt strategy that employed their larger non-nuclear weapons that can damage same as nuclear strikes on Japan during World War II, new missile launch systems like Rapid Dragon and display force in the conflicting area. But still have their nuclear option on table, rather rely on tactical nuclear warhead US should employ its GBU-43/B MOAB non-nuclear bomb for the tactical targets and deterrence and use nukes as a last option in case of attack on homeland. And in the case of Israel, they should have their nukes on their missiles, as a small state Israel can’t take a nuke shot, if Israelis did it then game is over of the state of Israel. In the case of UK, British should use their Naval power as a means of deterrence against a non-nuclear power or a nuclear power who is outside from the Western hemisphere and if the opponent is a nuclear power near British island like Russia, then British should use their nukes to deter Russia. Same for France as British with an addition, France should use it nukes first place if threat is in European soil and France military can’t do anything to stop the threat because unlike UK, France don’t have the security of water.
But one think state leadership should be clear don’t just go nuclear, if no option is left and existence of the state or an objectives or system (allies' system of US) is in threat and no way left for the state to protect their interest then, they can think to use their nukes to achieve their objectives. Use their nukes doesn't mean that state should launce a nuclear strike on their opponent, nukes can be used as a form of threat to opponent.
State should maintain a strong industrial and manufacturing capability. Industrial power will the backbone of the “flexible strategy”, it provides the ability to wage a conventional war or resistance pressure or a blocked by a Great Power. For instance, let's take a hypothetical scenario of a full-scale conventional war between two Asian giants, state “A” and “B”, both have very strong and large conventional military of same in terms of size and power, but “B” has far more industrial power compared to “A” around 6x more. In case of full-scale war chances of winning is more for the “B” because it can replace battle loses more faster than the “A”, in long run “B” can overwhelmed and crushed the “A” military might.
In the rapidly changing environment of world politics and a new age of Great Power competition, it is important for states employed a “flexible strategy” for achieving their national objectives. A flexible strategy, encompassing a spectrum of tools from conventional might to nuclear deterrence, economic resilience, and soft power, provides states with the means to navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics. In a quest for security and stability, states must remain vigilant, employing these strategies properly, and ensuring that the nuclear conflict remains a last resort, employed not as a weapon but as a shield of deterrence. Anchoring such strategies on a robust industrial base further fortifies a nation's capacity to withstand the pressures of an ever-changing world. As we confront the future, this adaptive approach stands as a cornerstone for securing national interests and preserving peace on the global stage.
In conclusion, we explore the origin and the historical context of limited nuclear war and go through the debates surrounding the limited nuclear war. Each an augment on limited nuclear war, explore their strength and weakness and reached a point that in current complex world there is no black and white solution, every solution has its own nuances. Unlike the cold war period, current world order far more complicated there is no state or organization in the world that can fully understand what is going on or what will be the consequence of an action. Instead of taking limited nuclear war as an evil or great strategy, policymakers should think about the utility and situation, adopt a policy based on a "flexible strategy" that incorporates a spectrum of tools, from conventional might to nuclear deterrence, economic resilience, and soft power. But nuclear option should remain a last resort, used not as a weapon but as a shield of deterrence.
In the quest for security and stability, states must recognize that there is no single strategy that can address all challenges of modern world. The moder world demands a multi-faceted approach, where each strategy is playing a unique role to securing national interest and preserving peace in the world politics. In the end, it is not a matter of choosing one strategy over another but of utilizing the right strategy for the right circumstances, ensuring a safer and more stable future.